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Honors Thesis Abstract
This paper is a study of effective competition in the United States Economy, for
Sector NAICS 51 -Information.
The purpose of the study is to learn current competitive conditions of the U.S.
economy, since the last study on this subject is at least 20 years old. It is impossible to
do the entire economy in one semester, so one sector was decided upon as a start. Sector
51 was “new” and full of exciting technology that is changing our everyday lives, so it
was a good fit for a starting point for a much larger study I will do later. This paper only
makes claims for Sector 51, not for the economy as a whole.
The method o f research was that of William G. Shepherd’s study completed in
1982. It includes a great amount of research, analysis, and drafting. The major
“findings” are the actual results of placing industries into competitive categories. I have
found that the distribution of Sector 5 l ’s $623,213 billion of national income comes from
the following sources: 0% originates in pure monopolies, 16.6% originates in dominant
firms, 44.5% originates in tight oligopolies, and the remaining 34% originates in
effectively competitive industries.
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Motivation
In 1982, William G. Shepherd stated that the United States Economy appeared to
be far more competitive than at any time during the modem industrial period. (13, p. 613)
He asserted that the strongest single cause of increased competition was the emergence of
antitrust policy, though he also gave mention of import competition and deregulation.
The ensuing 20 years saw a greater reliance on international trade, the effects of
deregulation, which were really in infant stages in 1980, greater privatization, the
collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and perhaps a de-emphasis of
antitrust enforcement. The Microsoft case promises to be a landmark decision. AT&T
and IBM have been left alone in the last 15 years or so, and further, regulation of telecom
giant AT&T has been virtually eliminated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which I will discuss later.
My reason for undertaking this project at first was extremely simple, I was
curious. My reason for this undertaking was because there was no new information about
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competition. The last comprehensive study of the extent of competition dates to 1980, in
Dr. Shepherd’s 1982 article Causes of Increased Competition In the US Economy, 1939-

1980 in The Review of Economics and Statistics. My purpose is to extend the research to
include the events of the last 20 years. For this paper I chose NAICS Sector 51Information. This sector is at the forefront of the “new” economy. It contains those
firms providing online services, designing the software for those services; many means
for online retail sales; broadcasting, information gathering, and several other aspects of
the economy. This sector of the economy is growing fast, it is new as defined by NAICS,
is worth hundreds o f billions of dollars in its own sector alone, and it’s growing
competitive conditions are in question. Total retail sales affected by e-commerce are
expected to be about $647 billion by 2005 (2, p. 69). The Clinton Administration
declared the “National Information Infrastructure” was essential to maintaining
international competitiveness in the information age (11, p. 93). Economic evaluation of
this sector is very important because long term impacts of technological change are
always hard to forecast, especially so in the case of e-commerce, where market share is
currently very far from equilibrium (2, 3). Along with telephone communications,
railroad shipping, electrification of production processes, and other technologies, this will
become another part of the critical backbone on which business relies (3, pp. 3,12). This
sector contains many o f these important firms.
Another reason this sector is important is that a great amount of value can be
added by operations in this sector. Value can be created by decreasing costs or by
improving the match between buyer preference and the goods they purchase. Indeed,
technology will often embrace changes that span both cost and the demand side (3, p. 5).
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Lower search costs in digital markets will make it easier for buyers to find low cost
sellers, thus promoting price competition among sellers. This may be significant in
markets where products are differentiated, reducing monopoly power enjoyed by sellers
and leading to lower seller profits while increasing efficiency and economic welfare.
Care must be taken because electronic selling raises either great potential for strong
competitive equilibrium in online markets, or for incremental price discrimination (2, p.
69-75). But even price discrimination can increase social welfare by increasing the
number o f purchasing consumers and thus reducing deadweight loss (2, p. 79).
The expressions “ information age” and “ global information economy” are used
with considerable frequency today. The general idea of an “ information economy”
includes both the notion of industries primarily producing, processing, and distributing
information, as well as the idea that every industry is using available information and
information technology to reorganize and make themselves more productive (26).
Therefore, as a first step to studying the current conditions of the U.S. Economy,
applying Dr. Shepherd’s methods to this new and exciting industry seems a good place to
start.
The increased efficiency from Sector 51 is likely to provide enough social gains
for both consumers and producers to benefit, but the question of who benefits by how
much remains to be worked out (2, p. 79). This project will show the current competitive
conditions of this very important sector.
This Sector has a large effect on the economy today. The internet and related
technologies have caused the costs of many kinds of market interactions to plummet.
Technology is important to an economy since the internet creates value by vastly
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lowering the cost of transferring many types of information, on a one-to-one, one-tomany, or many-to-many basis. In cases where the product itself is information, the
potential for value creation is enormous (3, p. 3-4). Sector 51 seemingly transcends the
entire economy. The internet simplifies custom manufacturing, such as my built-for-me
Dell PC. Dell’s experience suggests that changing the way that goods are made can yield
significant cost savings and improvements in the match between buyer preferences and
the goods they purchase (2, p. 8,3, p. 76).
The potential for creating value by improving access to goods arises from the
tremendous cost of maintaining inventories in a wide variety of products across
geographically dispersed outlets, coupled with high search and transportation costs for
consumers, which results at present in a great deal of compromising on product attributes.
In contrast, on-line stores benefit from enormous economies of centralized inventories. A
company like The Gap, which has close to 2000 stores in the U.S. alone, can carry
inventory to meet demand in every style, size, and color combination at much lower costs
when it does so at a small number o f distribution centers than when it attempts to do so
on a store by store basis (3, p. 7). This is a way of segmenting a firm’s market that
provides great benefits to both producers and consumers.
This sector even includes the providers of telephone and telecommunication lines
on which internet services run. As the cost of bandwidth declines, the impersonal setup
o f internet shopping will decrease, as we will be able to see more product dimensions and
have more direct observation of products. The firms that provide software to run
computers that get us on the internet, are in this sector too. Microsoft is a good example.

Carrying out this type of project is “simple in concept but difficult in practice”
(13, p. 613). Shepherd (1982) provides a model of my study in “Causes of Increased
Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939-1980” (13). The degree of competitiveness of
the U.S. Economy must be understood and maintained to protect consumers’ freedoms.
Dr. Shepherd evaluated the economy for 1939, 1958, and 1980.
The Meaning of Competition
The idea that competitive markets allocate resources efficiently is a core idea for
this paper. First, I will review three essential elements of market structure that are
necessary to explain as they have strong bearing on an industry’s placement into a
competitive category. Following that, I will introduce Shepherd’s competitive categories.
The meaning of an industry’s structure is embodied in the size distribution of
firms (15, p. 7). Oligopolistic markets are characterized by a significant concentration of
sellers (1, p. 26). In oligopolistic industries there is a temptation for sellers to act
“collectively” in establishing prices and outputs, whereas in atomistic industries, any
attempted collusion will fail and every seller will act independently in adjusting to a
market price and output which is outside any seller’s control (1, pp. 26-27). There are
four important terms used by economists to assess market structure: market share of
individual firms, concentration of the leading firms, the numbers of comparable rivals,
and the conditions of entry.
Market share is that proportion of the market any company holds. It can range
from nearly zero to 100%. Conventionally, a monopoly holds 90%+ by itself. Market
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share is the most important single indicator of the firm’s degree of monopoly. Higher
market shares almost always provide higher monopoly power, whereas low shares
involve little or none. A related topic here is market power. As market share increases,
the market power attained by that firm traditionally grows because that firm is then
receiving a larger than normal share of sales receipts. The extra money allotted to that
firm allows for purchases of extra resources. These resources would otherwise be
allocated to other competing firms. This impedes competition by possibly not allowing
other firms to act on otherwise attainable gains from trade.
For the purposes of this paper, market power is thought o f as the ability to raise
prices above competitive levels. This concept is measured in “degrees” of market power.
According to Shepherd, “a” degree of market power usually appears when one firm’s
market share reaches about 15%. At 25 or 30 percent, there may be a substantial
lessening o f competition. At 40-50 percent, strong market power is usually a given. As
market share increases to one or very few firms, other competitors may be left behind,
and possibly forced to leave the market. In a case of effective competition, the firm
would be run out for losing, or not acting on, gains from trade. In the case of monopoly,
firms are artificially driven from the market (15, p. 71-72). Either losing or not acting on
gains from trade is a leaning toward lessening of competition as well as a decrease in
consumer choices. Too much of this behavior may cause inefficiencies, and a consumer
may see firms driven from the market. If this continues, there may be movement toward
tight oligopoly, dominant firm, or monopoly.
Concentration is the combined market share of the leading firms, commonly
based on the top four firms. Four firms are used typically because the minimum of the
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“many firms” needed to stop collusion is five (15, p. 8). There is some debate among
economists as to the number of firms needed to stop collusion, but in Industrial

Organization and Public Policy Douglas Greer shows that around five firms is a fair
number. His study with Art Fraas shows that collusion is least common in markets with
either very few or very large numbers of firms. This number puts us in some
“intermediate” range where conspiracies occur. Five is what starts Greer’s cut-off, as
well as Shepherd’s, and I use the same cut off for this paper (10, p. 401-403).
The behavior o f the top four firms and their concentration is studied. These firms
may be acting collusively as a shared monopoly, thereby indicating a competitive
problem, or they may be in fierce competition with each other, where there may be no
problem at all, or they may fall somewhere in the middle. Relatively high and stagnant
w

concentration ratios over time, little or no firm movement in and out o f the market, and
little or stagnant technological advancements are good indications of approaching
ineffective competition. These types of situations indicate a tight oligopoly. All or any
of these following three: relatively low ratios, frequent movement in and out of the
market, and great technological advances usually show signs of a competitive industry; a
few exceptions will be discussed further along. Concentration ratios show directly the
“degree of oligopoly” (15, p. 73). In this paper, with four firms, less than 40%
concentration is most likely safe, as the firms do not hold enough market power to act
collusively. 40%-50% may raise questions, as rising concentration is a typical warning
sign of ineffective competition. 50% to 59.9% is a cause to investigate a little further,
due to a greater possibility of collusion. Shepherd states that at a 4-firm concentration of
60% is usually a tight oligopoly (13, p. 616). As concentration reaches these higher
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numbers, the opportunities for collusive behavior increase, since a larger quantity of
receipts is going to a smaller number of firms, there is a better opportunity to collude or
lower prices below cost to drive at least fringe firms out of business. With a firm
exercising larger and larger economies of scale, there continues to be a gradual lessening
of competition. Careful watch is necessary here because price cutting is usually a step
toward efficiency.
Finally there is a study of barriers to entry. For a competitive economy, resources
move freely to emerging industries from failing industries. Any firm that wants to enter a
market should be free to do so with no limits other than the markets’ conditions. If it is
profitable to enter, a firm will do so, if not, they will not. Further, they can also exit
freely. Barriers to entry refer to impediments of this system.
Shepherd distinguishes exogenous and endogenous conditions of entry.
Exogenous barriers are set outside of the market but still have a substantial effect on
entry, such as advertising costs, size, and economies of scale (15, p. 76). Shepherd notes
there are at least 22 sources of barriers and thus, it is virtually impossible to estimate the
“height” o f actual barriers.
Efficiency means identifying and acting on all possible gains from trade. Scarce
resources are allocated to their most valuable uses, given preferences and abilities of the
people trading in the economy. True efficiency in production and consumption promotes
lower prices, better quality of production, and shows the extent of equilibrium in the
economy. To be competitive means you are discovering efficiency. An absence of
competition may suggest an absence of efficiency.

An “Effectively Competitive” industry shows entry into this market is reasonably
free, and the top four firms hold less than 40% of the market. The 1980 study shows over
76% of the U.S. Economy was in this category. Effective competition is different than
the textbook definition of competitive. The real question is: what is “effective”
competition? Dr. Shepherd sheds light on this important question. To be truly effective,
there must be many competitors, the actual number of which is relative to market
conditions. Further, they must be of comparable strength such that each firm exerts a
mutual pressure, so each firm must apply their maximum effort to remain effective in the
market. This then, prevents competitors from raising price above marginal cost by any
significant amount, and no competitor is removed from the market, save for the superior
efficiency o f others. Competitors should be numerous and reasonably well matched such
that the competitive process is robust and nobody captures lasting control. Usually, this
allows efficient, innovative and fair results (15, p. 1). The concentration ratios of sellers
must be relatively low. Entry barriers are minimal if present at all. There should be
some evidence of healthy turnover, as gains from trade are found, exploited, and lost.
Some firms will profit while inefficient ones are driven out by market forces. Products
are closely substitutable. In a textbook definition of competition there would be no
monopoly or oligopoly. Further it makes impossible product variety, loose oligopoly,
and monopoly. This is why we differentiate “effective” competition.
Effective Competition is an “all others” group that contains pure competition,
monopolistic competition, and loose oligopoly, and so no attempt to distinguish them is
needed at this level (13, p. 616). This is acceptable because Effective Competition does
not require pure competitive conditions. Shepherd says the middle range is where the

questions arise, because here markets often have just two to ten comparable firms and
less-than-ffee entry (15, p. 18).
Ineffective competition, on the other hand, manifests itself by a dominant firm,
tight oligopoly or a monopoly. One, or a few firms are able to raise price above marginal
cost in a substantial way, competitors are prevented from entering, and one or few
competitors is/are able to engage in price wars, driving the other(s) out. The otherwise
mutual pressure among competing firms disappears, such that one or few firms are able
to exert strong market power over others. The monopolist is able so set the price above
that which is otherwise competitive. This reduces gains from trade for the consumer (an
artificially high price) and other producers (resources can be allocated inefficiently to the
monopolist). A state of monopoly traditionally undermines efficiency, slowing
w

innovation, reducing freedom of choice and shifting wealth from ordinary citizens to
richer ones (15, p. 2).
“Tight Oligopoly” is the 1st meaningful distinction from effective competition.
The four firm concentrations matter here. If four firms hold over 60 percent of the
market share, that is a fairly good indication of a tight oligopoly. Oligopolies enjoy some
elasticity of demand, and are often able to cooperate in setting prices (15, p. 16). These
four firms may be operating as a collusive oligopoly and may need to be regulated. If
illegal operations are discovered in court, some fines, jail time, or other penalties may
result. On the other hand, these firms may be in fierce competition and simply have
merged to stay afloat. In which case, they may be protected under the Clayton Act.
Examples o f industries with tight oligopoly could be the aircraft industry, aluminum
industry, or carbonated beverage industry (i.e. Pepsi and Coca-Cola). The last two
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companies are quite large but have not been broken up, while aluminum manufacturer
Alcoa suffered the introduction of competition in the late 1940s. There is the possibility
that upon further investigation of an Industry originally placed in this classification, that
industry can be moved to effectively competitive if there appears to be fast innovation,
particularly technological in the Information sector, and flexible pricing.
The next category is “Dominant Firm.” A single firm controls 40 to 99 percent of
the market. Microsoft is a strong example of this. The same standards apply as in
monopolies, but with a few important differences. The allocative efficiency of
competition is lost here as well, as the dominant firm may behave much like a
monopolist, but usually there is some degree of competition because there are other
firms. Microsoft is able to segment markets, a traditional characteristic of ineffective
competition. Different prices are set to different people and places. Second, while there
is competition, the competition is minimal, which allows the dominant firm to exercise
great market power, and quite possibly grow toward monopoly. Monopoly and
dominance may arise from positive causes, such as economies of scale and superior
performance. However, the problem arises when the sources of dominance come from
neutral or anti-competitive causes, which exploit or even create market imperfections (15,
p. 8). As Shepherd challenges his audience in The Economics of Industrial Organization,
it becomes my duty to asses the sources of monopoly which will inform my audience if
the monopoly or dominant firm rose to prominence by competitive or anti-competitive
methods.
At the extreme, “Pure Monopoly” is a traditionally well-known situation. Pure
Monopoly means one firm owns 100% of its respective market. A few familiar examples

could be a local gas and electric company, the local water works, and possibly local
phone and cable TV providers. Sometimes, these monopolies are regulated; other times,
they are illegal. Monopoly is the opposite of competition; it is one firm without
competition. In theory, monopolies traditionally represent misallocations of resources. A
pure monopoly has only one firm, usually with high entry barriers and inelastic demand.
A monopolist shows a departure from competition. Without competition, economic
theory suggests there are inefficiencies. A monopolist almost always has an advantage
when buying resources. Its profits are usually well above the competitive level. Further,
a monopolist’s cost advantages allow it to segment markets. It can sell products in one
market at a lower price than competitors, while making up the difference in some other
market. While this is not necessarily bad, if this practice is used intentionally, to restrain
entry or drive others out or both, it becomes illegal. There is usually well-blocked entry
into the respective market, as well as evidence that the monopolist controls pricing.
These elements lead to a lessening of competition.
When Shepherd writes about a monopoly’s effect on economic performance, he
(and everyone else) says the misallocation is defined as a reduction in consumers’ surplus
(15, p. 44). The largest problem for the economy is that a monopolist represents a
reduction in the freedom of choice. Since it is understood that competitive markets
allocate resources efficiently, a monopolist takes away market efficiency, leaving other
producers and consumers worse off. This may necessitate an intervention by the
Department of Justice to break up the monopoly, as was done in the cases of Standard Oil
and Alcoa.
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The Data
The 1997 Economic Census makes use of a new classification system. The North
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS, pronounced “nakes”) was developed
in cooperation with Canada and Mexico, and classifies North America’s economic
activities at 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-digit levels of detail. The U.S. version of NAICS further
defines industries to a sixth digit. The 1997 Economic Census played a special role in
implementing NAICS as it was the first publication to use the system. For the purposes
of this paper, NAICS data were used for all but industry group 5111, which was not fully
implemented yet, so some Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) data from 1992 were
used. The hierarchic structure of the NAICS works as explained in the following table:
NAICS Level
Sector
Subsector
Industry Group
Industry
J U.S. Industry

| | NAICS Code j Description
| [51
Information
| 1513
Broadcasting and Telecommunications
jj 5133
Telecommunications
j]51332
Wireless telecommunications, except satellite
|j 513321
Paging

The “Sector” is the most aggregate classification level, always expressed as two digits.
Information is given number 51. The third digit represents a Subsector, such as the
broadcasting and telecommunications subsector. The fourth digit defines the industry
group, the example is 5133, Telecommunications.
These classifications are not to be confused with the old SIC 4-digit classification
which represented the specific industry. The fifth digit defines the NAICS Industry. The
sixth digit gives us the United States Industry. Sector 51 consists of 34 U.S. Industries,
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20 o f which are new, according to NAICS booklets. Straightforward comparability is
lost in the new system, so extra care was taken in finding out which industries were
entirely new and which were revised or reorganized.
The main subsectors are the publishing industries, including software publishing,
the motion picture and sound recording industries, the broadcasting and
telecommunications industries, and the information services and data processing services
industries. The unique characteristics of information and cultural products, and of the
processes involved in their production and distribution, distinguish the Information sector
from the goods-producing and service-producing sectors. Unlike traditional goods, an
“ information or cultural product,” such as a newspaper on-line, or a television program,
does not necessarily have tangible qualities, nor is it necessarily associated with a
particular form. (26)
The following table is the list of all 6-digit industries classified by the NAICS
system, all United States Industries defined by the United States Census Bureau, from the
1997 Economic Census. The 1997 Census contains the most recent information about
our economy as a whole. While this project is a thorough coverage of the Information
sector of our economy, it only accounts for $623,214 billion of the $17.81 trillion dollars
of the 97 U.S. Economy, or 3.5% (22), so it by no means represents the conditions of the
economy as a whole, and no such claims are made in this paper. As discussed at the
beginning of this paper, however, this sector operates on its own and also has large
effects on hundreds of other U.S. Industries. While only representing 3.5% of national
income, it processes trillions of dollars of the U.S. Economy. Therefore, it is a powerful
sector worthy of discussion on a more detailed level. It is, and will continue to be, a large

and growing sector of the United States Economy. It has an effect on the whole of the
economy, even internationally, as it contains industries that provide various services to all
facets of the economy: the national government, producers, and consumers. Some of the
firms in this sector provide a large number of export services and products to foreign
governments and firms, thus having a further impact on the international economy. This
is the Sector that truly forms the basis of our “global information economy.”

W

17

NAICS
Code
511110*
511120*
511130*
511140*
511191*
511199*
511210
512110
512120
512131
512132
512191
512199
512210
512220
512230
512240
512290
513111
513112
513120
513210
513220
513310
513321
513322
513330
513340
513390
514110
514120
514191
514199
514210

Description
Newspaper publishers
Periodical publishers
Book publishers
Database & directory publishers
Greeting card publishers
All other publishers
Software publishers
Motion picture & video production
Motion picture & video distribution
Motion picture theatres (except drive-ins)
Drive-in motion picture theatres
Teleproduction & other postproduction
services
Other motion picture &video industries
Record production
Integrated record production/distribution
Music publishers
Sound recording studios
Other sound recording industries
Radio networks
Radio stations
Television broadcasting
Cable networks
Cable & other program distribution
Wired telecommunications carriers
Paging
Cellular & other wireless telecommunications
Telecommunications resellers
Satellite telecommunications
Other telecommunications
News syndicates
Libraries & archives
Online information services
All other information services
Data processing services

2000
Competitive
Category
2
3
4
4
3
4
2
4
3
4
4
4
3
4
3
4
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

4-Firm
Concentration
Ratio
25.0
20.0
23.0
(X)**
84.0
32.0
28.2
33.5
74.7
31.1
32.4

National
Income in 51
($1000)***
41,601,011
29,884,807
22,648,251
12,258,101
5,338,986
5,604,847
61,699,420
20,152,091
12,508,661
7,486,977
110,342

8.7
69.7
20.4
66.9
48.5
6.9
48.8
53.2
23.2
48.6
61.1
48.8
47.0
50.3
51.4
16.6
45.6
44.9
50.7
24.0
39.0
40.1
42.7
TOTAL 51

3,684,397
843,184
182,369
8,735,863
1,368,407
540,601
312,641
851,348
9,796,786
29,777,076
10,389,609
34,999,969
208,790,552
16,970,204
20,918,658
7,592,298
5,096,182
1,133,004
1,402,374
860,933
8,042,568
794,692
30,836,645
623,213,854

% of
total 51
6.7%
4.8%
3.6%
2.0%
0.9%
0.9%
9.9%
3.2%
2.0%
1.2%
0.0%
0.6%
0.1%
0.0%
1.4%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
1.6%
4.8%
1.7%
5.6%
33.5%
2.7%
3.4%
1.2%
0.8%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
1.3%
0.1%
4.9%

'Income data was available for 1997, however ratio data was not so 1992 data were used Source: (21,22,26)
** (X) is a combination of 2 SIC categories, but both ratios are below 40, and barriers are low
*** See Appendix B

Percent of 51 income from each competitive category
$0
0.0%
1
2
$103,300,431
16.6%
44.5%
$277,343,010
3
4
$242,570,413
34.0%
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Analysis
The data was broken down by cross referencing some concentration data with
data on previous receipts and current sources of receipts. Mostly the data was
comparable with some old SIC code manuals and then with the Technical Appendix from
Dr. Shepherd. The Appendix provided insight into concentration ratios, showed cases
that needed more attention before judging them, and set fair and comparable standards for
classifying industries.
The 1997 Economic Census, compared with the results of Shepherd’s study
using the 1977 Economic Census, yielded a wealth of information as to current
conditions. Various books and articles on industrial organization, barriers to entry,
industrial concentration, and federal government regulations and acts were used in this
project. Most information came from the 1997 Census; the rest was needed to provide
interpretation of Census data and then to provide more specific and supplemental
information where needed. I will be using Dr. Shepherd’s methods for this paper. They
will be applied to the most recent data available.
The task here is to develop a “sufficiently detailed method for estimating the
degree of competition” in Sector 51, then to apply it to “the most recent year for which
adequate information is available” (13, p. 614-615). Generally speaking, the 6-digit U.S.
Industries were pulled from government economic census data, and their 4-firm
concentration ratios were studied. Any dubious cases were studied further. Dr. Shepherd
had government concentration data for 1939,1958, and 1977, so my estimations will be
for 1997, the closest available to the year 2000. Dr. Shepherd discusses methods of

attaining accurate approximations in his article, (13, p. 615) then explains that truly
adequate data are not available. Shepherd goes on to say that the closest approximation is
a 4-firm concentration ratio, which is available for manufacturing industries (13, p. 615).
For Sector 51, concentration ratios are readily available and were used also. The
assessment is made more difficult because within each structure of a market a variety of
different “behavioral competitiveness is possible.” Further, industries may have differing
values within each case (13, p. 615). Rather than basing information on mean values and
the like, Shepherd (and the previous authors) have focused on market shares, and I do the
same in this paper.
Dr. Shepherd noted in 1980, and the same is true today, that two kinds of
judgment are required. First, even when data are full and reliable one must often use
judgment in deciding which category the industry fits. Second, the evidence is rarely
thorough and reliable. One must use imperfect, informal data sources for analysis (13, p.
617). The results are tentative, and some are debatable, but any errors in classification
are likely to be random rather than biased (13, p. 617). While NAICS has made
information more specific and reliable, the same sort of rough judgments about the array
o f markets were needed (14).
For many industries, I checked entry and exit of firms by checking flow of
establishments from the census and movement into new areas by companies in various
industry reports. The data was available, with some crosschecking, for establishments.
In 511191-Greeting card publishers, for example, the number of establishments has
remained virtually unchanged for the last 20 years, and with high 4-firm concentration
(84.0%), also very steady for the last 20 years, it is best classified as a tight oligopoly.

Another example is software giant Microsoft’s investment in a totally different industry,
Cable network MSNBC. This move represents one firm from one industry branching out
and co-creating a firm in an entirely different industry. As firms move into new
industries or remove themselves from industries, the number fluctuates. However, little
or no movement, with rigid prices and little technological advancement, may be the signs
o f a competitive problem. With a sustained pattern of collusion and rigid market values,
an industry with concentration of even 40% may be placed in category 3.
NAICS U.S. Industry 511210, Software publishing, is certainly of special note.
Industry titan Microsoft is the driving force behind this industry, and on November 5,
1999, was convicted of illegal monopolization (6). Microsoft continues normal
operations, subject to a resolution, as that case is currently under appeal. Microsoft’s
dominance lies in that any software must be built on a platform of some kind. That
platform is typically called an operating system (OS). A few familiar names are the open
system called Linux and Microsoft’s Windows. With Microsoft’s Windows OS running
90% of the world’s personal computers, applications software of any kind benefits by
using a Microsoft base for its program to work properly. This has given Microsoft virtual
monopoly power in OS and business applications software, the two biggest sellers in
software.
Several other companies are writing various kinds of software. However, all
these companies’ software must run on an operating system, and 90% of those operating
systems are Microsoft’s Windows. Many consumers, no matter what they buy for their
computers, must pay homage to Microsoft. Typically, an Intel processor-based PC is
shipped with a Windows edition OS. As of the 1997 Economic Census, the top four
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firms have a CR of 28.8, seemingly in category 4. Upon closer study of this industry,
there are several forms of software: operating systems, such as Linux and Windows, and
business applications, such as Office. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software is
used in automating “back office” business processes and helping manage a company’s
day-to-day operations in manufacturing, distribution, accounting, and Human Resource
divisions. The major players here are SAP AG, Oracle, PeopleSoft Inc., J.D. Edwards
and Co., and Baan N.V. Consumer Relationship Management (CRM) software
automates sales, marketing, call center, and field service operations. The largest player
here is Siebel Systems, followed by Vantive Corporation, and Clarify Inc. In 2000 CRM
software was a $23 billion market. Another type of software is Supply Chain
Management (SCM) software, which provides help to manage the flow of products
across the supply chain, from raw materials procurement through manufacturing and
distribution to delivery of final goods to consumers. In 1999, this market was worth $4.4
billion, with leader i2, followed by Manugistics Group Inc. ERP leaders SAP AG and
Oracle are expected to challenge significantly here. There are also Applications Service
Providers (ASP) and Internet Security software.
The overall software leaders are Microsoft, IBM, and Sun Microsystems (4). The
above-mentioned sellers have three options: (a) compete with Microsoft, (b) make their
software compatible with Microsoft, or (c) cooperate with Microsoft. The difference in
the last two is this: the companies may either design software on a Microsoft base or
Microsoft is called in with the other firm to provide the necessary hardware and/or
software to make the system or network run properly. So, the firm simply provides
Microsoft compatible software or hardware, or they make a deal with Microsoft for
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Microsoft to provide compatible equipment, be it software, network setups, or otherwise
(4). A vertical problem arises here. All market power derives from final demand. Thus,
the dominance “upstream” is enough to exercise market power over final consumers in
this market. Microsoft, therefore, holds a strong dominant firm (category 2) position in a
relatively low concentrated industry, regardless of where competition comes from or how
fierce they claim it may be.
U.S. Industry 512110-Motion Picture and Video Production, is a category four
with a CR o f 33.5 that deserves some explaining. This category is divided into two 7digit sub-U.S. industry categories. Motion Picture Production (except for TV) and
Motion Picture & Video Production for TV are the sub-categories. It is arguable that
tight oligopoly is in place here; with sub-category Motion Picture Production (except for
TV) having a CR of 53.6, but the potential for entry is very possible, with many
worldwide studios available for production needs. Hollywood is increasingly shooting
films overseas and across our borders, for various reasons, including lower costs, film
production incentives, and non-union labor (5). TV stations also have potential entry
and motion picture studios cooperate competitively with movie studios for production
needs. Motion Pictures are in competition with Cable and Broadcast networks as well as
internet and video games, and all are in competition with Motion Pictures. With TVs and
cable as well as video game systems and internet service prices at affordable competitive
levels, this industry is classified as effectively competitive. Further, the industry reports
state that in film entertainment, conglomerates have advantages, but the real advantage is
that they are able to diversify. This industry is one to watch, as these firms may start
buying out several potential competitors. However, new entry DreamWorks SKG is
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growing strongly, but only after about $3 billion initial capital fund raising. In this
industry however, revenues change greatly every few years. Disney appears to be the
only case with consistently high revenue marks; however, theirs too changes yearly (5).
The top revenue studio one year may not be in the top five or ten the next year (5). In
1997 for example, Sony held 20.4% of box office receipts, but fell to 8.8% by 2000. All
the movement and activity in this industry looks to be effectively competitive. There
appears to be a very loose and flexible oligopoly in movie production. Imports are
minimal as American movies constitute the majority of the box office receipts in Western
Europe and Japan. Thus, we give 512110 an effectively competitive label.
U.S. Industry 512120-Motion Picture & Video Distribution, has a CR of 74.7.
This industry is further divided into two 7-digit categories also, separating Motion Picture
Film Exchanges, and Film or Tape Distribution for Television. Here there is a tight
oligopoly, not a dominant firm due to a further separation at the U.S. Industry level. The
further levels are held to tight oligopoly by licensing and contracts allowing for some
exclusivity as these industries are primarily engaged in acquiring the rights to distribute
motion pictures (25). However, there is no one firm that holds itself too high above its
competitors. Tight oligopoly fits best here.
AT&T is known by almost everyone as a true giant in its industry, NAICS
513310, Wired Telecommunications Carriers. This industry is distinct from telephone
equipment manufacturing, which will be discussed in a later paper. Throughout the last
100 years, AT&T held dominant firm position (category 2), or pure monopoly (category
1). The sluggish performance in a monopolistic industry was shown when AT&T was
slow to bring in dialing in the 1940s in place of live operators, slow to adopt electronic

switching in the 1960s, and slow to install optical fibers in the 1970s and 1980s (16).
Creative destruction may result in a monopoly market, as in the case of AT&T’s slow
innovation (13, p. 616). For example, AT&T’s inflexibility was shown in vigorous fights
against simple little “mouthpiece hoods” and Bell System equipment could only be
rented, not bought. There were no wall jacks permitting equipment to be plugged in. An
extension cord for a residence telephone would have to be rented from the local Bell
Company, at a rate o f perhaps $3 per month, ($36 per year) for a wire costing perhaps $1
to produce. (16, pp. 345, 360)
As of the last study of the U.S. Economy, William G. Shepherd listed this
industry as category 2 with AT&T the dominant firm (17). Also in 1982, he noted that
throughout the economy it was “important to maintain effective antitrust, regulatory and
international trade policies in order to sustain” the then-new degree of competition (13, p.
613). Two years later in 1984, AT&T agreed to a break up of what was then the world’s
largest company. The following 18 years have seen an explosion of new firms, and new
technology.
A topic very relevant to this U.S. Industry is the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “Act”) is
the first major overhaul of telecommunications law in almost 62 years. The goal of this
new law is to let anyone enter any communications business —to let any communications
business compete in any market against any other (7). The 1996 Telecommunications
Act permitted telephone companies and cable operators to enter one another’s lines of
business. Also FCC rule changes have relaxed rules that previously limited companies
absolute size as well as relative size in a given market (5, 28). Since then merger activity
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and “cross industry” investment has been moving at a frenzied pace (4, 5). While
concentration ratios have remained frequently above the 40 percent mark, competition
has significantly increased, in some traditionally highly concentrated industries. Rural
Markets, as defined in the Act, are the only real exemptions throughout the Act, but are
still required to provide adequate information to the FCC to maintain their
“independence” from the Act, relative to precise conditions laid out by the FCC. This
Act first removes barriers to entry by prohibiting any state or local jurisdiction from
blocking any entity from providing telecommunications services. Next it maintains that
all telecommunications carriers are required to interconnect directly or indirectly with
other carriers. This includes Local Exchange Carriers (LECs), as defined in the Act, and
Incumbent LECs. The Act provides for Universal Service. Universal Service is an
“evolving” level of telecommunications services that the FCC determines are essential,
have been subscribed to by a majority of customers, are being deployed in public
networks by carriers and are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity. The Act allows for Bell Operating Companies (BOC) entry into long distance
and manufacturing. Telephone companies are allowed to offer video programming
directly to their subscribers within their service area, under regulation. Buyouts are
permitted as well, a telephone company may own more than 10% interest in a cable
company, and vice versa, under certain regulations.
Throughout this Act there is regulation for almost every subsection, most
frequently the regulations are price cap regulations. The great difference, economically,
is that barriers to entry have been removed, deregulation has increased, and the FCC is
required to review regulations every 2 years. This has caused greater crossownership,

merger, and buyout activity in the telecommunications industry group (NAICS 5133).
This industry group affects directly almost 20% of this entire sector’s U.S. Industries
(28).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 appears to be the driving force behind
movement to effective competition in telecommunications. It has great intentions for the
U.S. Economy, and federal regulators have been highly effective in implementing the
Act, which has stimulated competition in communications markets across the United
States. Respect must be paid to comments made by Dr. Shepherd in his 1993 article in
Larry Duetsch’s Industry Studies. (See source 16) Dr. Shepherd makes it clear that long
distance service, a major part of U.S. Industry 513310, which is the single largest player
financially, in Sector 51, does not have effective competition, nor is effective competition
imminent. I concur, and that is why I have placed U.S. Industry 513310 in category 3.
Further, Shepherd also states that any moves toward deregulating AT&T require caution,
sophistication, and a clear use of competitive criteria. (16, p. 360) Based on Shepherd’s
idea that effective deregulation was not possible for 5 to seven years, the U.S.
Government may have passed this Act prematurely. Shepherd also takes issue with
contestability as a possibility for increased competition. (It should be noted that
contestability theory further says that if a market is contestable, other entry barriers are
essentially irrelevant (15, 16). Whether you agree or not with contestability theory, it
appears that Congress expects contestability to perform well in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. It is obvious that the Baby Bells are seen as a large and powerful source of
competition to Ma Bell in long distance service. Also the cable companies are seen as
powerful sources of competition. The removal of entry barriers in the Act are a stark

contrast to Shepherd’s analysis in 1993. Deregulation is in place and vigorous
competition is expected to follow (See sources 3,4 ,1 6, and 28).
The United States government has taken a big step in this respect. What has been
done has been done and we are forced to watch. Unfortunately, the dust is still up in the
air. It appears as of this paper, the Act has worked. Conditions may be on their way to
effective competition. The question is still there, however, will they stay this way. All in
all, Shepherd’s warnings are still to be heeded, and we may be witnessing a powerful test
case for contestability theory, as the Act looks to make the market contestable by
allowing the Baby Bells to compete head to head with Ma Bell. This is a change because
previously, the Baby Bells have been held at bay against going into long distance.
However, AT&T’s apparent furious competition may only be a rush backward to
dominant firm or monopoly status. This sector has been allowed to sneak by Antitrust
with minimal trouble (16). Now that we have this Act, we must watch the outcome
carefully. Effective applications of the Sherman and Clayton Acts as well as the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 are necessary to move this sector of the economy to
effectively competitive levels.
AT&T still controls large market share, enough to remain powerful, but not as it
once did. The 1996 Telecommunications Act allowed for reduced regulation and more
growth, and the industry has responded with a vengeance. For the first time AT&T is
part of a tight but loosening oligopoly, category 3, that seems to be well on its way into
category 4. Now is not the time to give 513310 as effectively competitive, because entry
and exit is still occurring. At first, prices fell, then became stable and are now rising
again. AT&T remained sluggish in implementing similar programs as Sprint and MCI’s
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“friends and family” types (5). But this once monopoly firm has come under attack from
W

its former partners, the well know Baby Bells, who are now allowed to compete in long
distance. The attack is made more severe by satellite telecommunications resellers, and
wireless and cellular phones. Prices of cellular plans are beginning to seriously challenge
the service of wired phone lines.
The 1996 Telecom Act has further opened this market to competition from several
new industry groups. Microsoft is currently investing billions in cable,
telecommunications equipment and forging alliances with wireless phone service
providers (4, 5). Current competitive conditions include pricing pressures, emails,
wireless messaging, instant messaging, and chat rooms that have begun to affect the total
volume of long distance calls. The current competitive edge enjoyed by the Baby Bells
has been supported by their new entry into long distance. However, the edge seems to be
eroding as new firms pop up and grow, and the 1996 Telecom Act opens them up to
almost limitless competition. Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) Verizon
Communications Inc., SBC Communications Inc., BellSouth Corp. and Qwest
Communications Inc., have all applied for, or are already offering long distance service.
Independent Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) are subject to far less stringent
requirements and many have launched long distance service (5). The leading telecom
companies are branching out into other markets, primarily wireless phone,
broadband/cable, and DSL services (5). The companies in those respective industries are
now launching telecom services as well, thanks to the 1996 Telecom Act. Prices seem to
fluctuate well with potential and current demand. Technology is a very influential
driving force here as well (5). The balance of power seems to be shifting from
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companies to consumers. There is ample evidence of movement in the 5133Telecommunications industry group toward effective competition. Mergers and alliances
are becoming quite common, and care must be taken to effectively apply the Sherman
and Clayton and 1996 Telecom Acts to sustain the path toward true competition.
Another point to be made here is local service remains somewhat regulated,
helping to increase the CR but not adversely affecting the competitive conditions, and the
FCC is taking careful steps to review regulation every two years (28). In various sources
there is little evidence that long distance service has fallen into effective competition (4,
5,11,16). However, the same sources show that true dominance by AT&T is gone, and
it is part o f a tight oligopoly. If the current trends continue we should see this industry
move into effective competition.
The next case that I will discuss here is 513321, the Paging Industry. I classify
this Industry as effectively competitive, despite a CR of 50.3, but it is a unique case.
There appears to be no entry or exit from this industry. Anyone in the surrounding
sectors could enter but few to none have chosen to do so. Barriers are essentially low, yet
there is little movement. Collusion in this industry is easily available, but none is evident
(4,5). The firms involved here use very similar technology, and this same technology is
readily available to many other telecommunications firms, (5) yet no one is moving into
this sector. The industry reports provided the insight that this industry is concentrated
because it is becoming obsolete (5). Relatively few firms are participating, but it does
not appear that they face competition from other paging companies. They face stiff
competition from the all-in-one wireless phones. Paging is being run out while instant
messaging, text messaging, wireless internet access, voice mail, paging, and phone is all
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placed in one small machine as opposed to one small box that beeps or vibrates, and
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scrolls a small message. The bottom line is while competition is lacking in this category,
it appears to be obsolete, and is being overrun by technological innovation, thus category
4.
Finally, NAICS 51 categories defined as “other” bring up another concentration
issue I must address. Sectors 512199—Other motion picture & video industries, CR 69.7,
512290-Other sound recording industries, CR 48.8, 513390-Other telecommunications,
CR 44.9, and 514199-All other information services, CR 40.1, all have CRs over 40.
However, only 512199-Other motion picture and video industries, is not effectively
competitive. O f these four, only 512199 has medium to high barriers to entry. 512290 is
a creation of two partial categories from the old SIC codes. It uses audio tape technology
that is now very accessible. Seemingly any person with the time, and the money to buy a
tape recorder, could enter this industry. 513390 is not as easily accessible, however it is
part o f the currently vigorous telecommunications industry group, and any one of the
companies in Industry Group 5133 easily has the potential to enter that market if they
perceive gains from trade. 514199 is a dumping category made exclusive from SIC code
8999 (pt) All Other Information Services, NEC (Not Elsewhere Classified). Again, the
services provided here have very low barriers to entry. It includes telephone based
information recordings and information search services on a contract basis (26).
Summary and Closing
Representing national income in Sector 51, again, in terms of only the $623,214
billion originating in sector 51, 0% comes from pure monopolies. 16.6% of this sector’s
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income was in the dominant firm category. 16.6% of this represents $103.45 billion
originating in dominant firms. For category three, tight oligopoly, 44.5% or $277.33
billion o f Sector 51 income is represented here. Finally, 34% originates in effectively
competitive industries. This represents a total of $212 billion coming out of effectively
competitive industries. It is of note that in category 3, $208.8 billion dollars appears to
be on its way to effectively competitive from 513310, as the wired telephone giants are
introduced to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and come under intense pressure
from wireless carriers and the internet.
The extent of competition is this sector seems to be largely due to antitrust,
deregulation, and technological development. Imports in this sector are minimal. A few
examples o f firms with imports against this sector would be Sony, and the Voice Stream
global cellular network, the only one of its kind (4, 5). Microsoft is currently in antitrust
litigation, after being convicted of illegal monopolization. AT&T is feeling the effects of
deregulation, the 1996 Telecom Act, large technological advances in the last twenty years
and the results o f antitrust pressure in the mid-1980s.
Overall, technological change and the 1996 Telecommunication Act appear to be
the driving forces behind movements toward effective competition in this Sector. Anti
trust policy is evident but really insignificant in this Sector unless something substantial
happens to Microsoft. Dominating everything is technology improvements. The U.S.
has seen the internet and computers explode, some cellular phones have become entirely
digital, with various other features at a price starting to rival in-home analog phones.
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Appendix A
This is a more detailed breakdown of NAICS’s publishing sectors, relative to the
(X) placed in the chart.
NAICS
Code
511110
511120
511130
511140
511191
511199

Description
Newspaper publishers
Periodical publishers
Book publishers
Database & directory
publishers
Greeting card publishers
All other publishers

SIC
equivalent
2711
2721
2731
2741
7331
2771
2741

SIC Description
Newspapers
Periodicals
Book Publishing (pt)
Miscellaneous publishing (pt)
Direct mail advertising services (pt)
Greeting cards (pt)
Miscellaneous publishing (pt)

All sectors are direct descendants of SIC industries, or reasonably comparable, except
511140, which is a combination of two SIC categories. This is an example of the more
detailed breakdown used by NAICS. Previously any SIC code with a “(pt)” following it
was simply one code with various “parts” to it. Several of these now warrant their own
code, and NAICS has given one to them. They are comparable in that they are the same
description, merely now given their own code. For these, comparable concentration data
were available, and used. Sector 511140’s previous data are two separate categories,
with two separate concentration ratios, from two different sectors, and not directly
comparable. The sectors are independently effectively competitive, so while the chart
has no concentration ratio for 511140, it is placed in category 4, effectively competitive.
The 1997 Economic Census has income data available and this data was used, however
concentration ratios are not computed for 1997, so the closest comparable ratios were in
1992 SIC codes, and these were used per the methods above. For all other United States
Industries in 51,1997 Census data contained both concentration ratios and income data,
and these were used.
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Appendix B
Income is defined based on Census definition of “Receipts” as follows:
Receipts from customers or clients for services rendered, from the use of facilities, and
from merchandise sold during 1997, whether or not payment was received in 1997.
Receipts include royalties, license fees, and other payments from the marketing of
intangible products (e.g., licensing the use of or granting reproduction rights for software,
musical compositions, and other intellectual property). Receipts also include the rental
and leasing of vehicles, equipment, instruments, tools, etc.; total value of
service contracts; market value of compensation received in lieu of cash; amounts
received for work subcontracted to others; dues and assessments for members and
affiliates; this establishment’s share of receipts from departments, concessions, and
vending and amusement machines operated by others. Receipts from services provided to
foreign customers from U.S. locations, including services performed for foreign parent
firms, subsidiaries, and branches are included. Public broadcast stations and libraries
include receipts from contributions, gifts, grants, and income from interest, rental of real
estate, and dividends.
U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1997 Economic Census, Subject
Series Summary, Information, Appendix A
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